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The announced primary objective of the European Central Bank is price stability. While
no restrictive reference is given to how the goal should be reached, such a mandate can be
thought as a concern to stabilize some relevant macroeconomic aggregates. Accordingly,
we frame ECB monetary policy in a general set up that allows policy makers to weight
di¤erently positive and negative deviations of in‡ation and output gaps. The empirical
analysis on aggregated Euro area data indicates that ECB monetary policy can be char-
acterized by a nonlinear policy rule. While the objective of price stability is symmetric,
the one on real activity is not in that output contractions require larger policy responses.
Moreover, the actual Euro interest rate highly commoves with the counterfactual rate that
the Bundesbank would have followed if charged to set policy rates for the Euro area.
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11 Introduction
The …rst four years of the EMU can be described as a period of low and stable in‡ation.
Despite a fairly smooth path, price changes have been persistently above the threshold value
of 2%, being however still consistent with a quantitative de…nition of price stability over the
medium-term. The left-top panel of Figure 1 shows that after some encouraging initial records,
HICP in‡ation has overcome the threshold in April 2000 without crossing it back afterwards.
However, the frequent reversals observed in the second half of the sample suggests that the
primary objective of price stability has been successfully pursued such as to legitimate a larger
concern to some secondary objectives.
In the introductory statement to the ECB press conference on 8 April 1999, Willem Duisen-
berg makes the argument clear by stating ’the present situation and the prospects for the in-
crease in the rate of in‡ation are such that they seem, for as far as we can look forward, also
to remain well below that ceiling of 2%. So, in‡ation is not a danger, which enabled us to
pay more attention to the second area of objectives of the European Central Bank - that is to
support the general economic policies of the European Community’. Such a concern reemerges
in another introductory statement on 8 November 2001 when he reasons ’the maintenance of
price stability remains our …rst priority. [...] today’s (cut of 50 point basis) could be taken
”without prejudice to price stability”, and it thereby supported the other goals of EMU, such as
economic growth’.
These statements do not come as a surprise if one considers that in an era of in‡ation
stability, output developments may actually be a better leading indicator for in‡ation than
in‡ation itself. Then, monitoring the business cycle would be a successful strategy to preemp-
tively avoid any in‡ation scare. However, given the pervasive downward risks that appear to
characterize the recent history of Euro area economic activities, the monetary authorities may
face an incentive to develop a greater precautionary demand for output expansions than for
low in‡ation in an e¤ort to escape recessions and realize better policy outcomes.
A simple modeling device to frame monetary policy making is to regard policy interventions
2as the solution of an intertemporal optimization problem according to which the central bank
minimizes some quadratic criterion under the constraints provided by the structure of the
economy. The quadratic characteristic of the objective and the linear feature of the constraints
give rise to a linear …rst order condition whose reduced-form parameters can only be interpreted
as convolutions of policy makers’ preferences and the behavioral parameters of the economy
(see Dennis, 2002, and Favero and Rovelli, 2003). To the extent that policy objectives identify
policy regimes, modelling and recovering the preferences of the central bank then becomes
crucial in evaluating the performance of the monetary authorities.
This paper contributes to the literature on monetary policy rules by developing a novel
identi…cation scheme for policy makers’ preferences. The latter requires the estimation of
the targeting rule, which is the …rst order condition that solves the optimization problem
relevant to the central bank. As the proposed model generalizes the conventional linear-
quadratic framework, the targeting rule turns out to be potentially nonlinear, with asymmetric
preferences and a convex aggregate supply curve being the sources of nonlinearity.
Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that decision makers are allowed, but not required,
to weight di¤erently positive and negative deviations of in‡ation and output gaps, and this
is motivated by a recent empirical literature on some G7 economies (see Bec, Salem and
Colard, 2002, Cukierman and Muscatelli, 2002, Ruge-Murcia, 2003, and Surico, 2002, among
others). The aggregate supply curve is convex in that its slope varies with the level of capital
utilization, and it is introduced to account for the evidence on aggregated Euro area data
reported by Peersman and Smets (2002), and Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2003). It
should be noted that while both types of nonlinearity may prove to be empirically relevant,
neither asymmetric preferences nor a convex supply curve are imposed in the model. Rather,
they are nested in a fairly general speci…cation that recovers the linear-quadratic set up for
some limiting case of parameter values. This implies that potential evidence of nonlinearities
in the central bank …rst order condition can be disentangled, tested and reverse engineered
into its relevant source(s).
3The empirical analysis must acknowledge the short time length of the sample that spans a
period of …ve years. While the available observations do not allow any way out of the issue, we
discuss below the extent to which our estimates provide a useful preliminary evaluation of how
the ECB conducts monetary policy. The main results using monthly Euro area aggregated
data over the period 1997:7-2002:10 can be summarized as follows. First, there is no evidence
of asymmetric responses to movements in in‡ation. In the words of the Chief Economist
Otmar Issing (2002b), ”the de…nition of price stability is symmetric in the sense that the
ECB is concerned about risks of de‡ation as well in‡ation. [...The former] can be substantially
reduced by avoiding that in‡ation falls below some safety margin”. Second, output contractions
of a given amount bring about a more vigorous policy response than output expansions of the
same magnitude, consistently with an asymmetric objective. Third, the observed path of the
Euro policy rate highly commoves with the counterfactual targets implied by the estimates of
the Bundesbank and the Fed reaction functions, given the historical Euro area measures of
in‡ation and output gaps. However, unlike the Bundesbank, the Fed-type of behavior would
require a substantially more aggressive policy stance. Fourth, adding a monetary aggregate to
both the policy objectives and the structure of the economy suggests that the M3 growth rate
is regarded as a leading indicator for future in‡ation rather than as a target per sè in that it
enters as an argument of the policy rule but not as an argument of the objective function.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, introduces nonlinearity and
solves for the central bank optimal control problem. Section 3 derives its empirical version
and shows how asymmetric preferences and a convex aggregate supply can be independently
identi…ed. The following part reports the estimates for the ECB, the Bundesbank and the Fed,
and perform the counterfactual experiment for the Euro area. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We assume that the central bank conducts monetary policy through a targeting rule according
to the terminology of Svensson (1999). Thus, all available information is used at each point in
4time to bring the target variables in line with their targets by penalizing any future deviation
of the former from the latter.
In a recent public speech as Governor of the Fed, Bernanke (2003) argues that the actual
practice of the US Federal Reserve and many of the major central banks around the world is
better described as constrained discretion. The latter is de…ned by two simple and parsimonious
principles that bring together some basic features of discretion and rules. First, the central
bank must establish a strong commitment to keeping in‡ation low and stable. Second, subject
to the condition that the …rst principle is satis…ed, monetary policy should strive to limit
cyclical swings in resource utilization. To the extent that these principles do also inspire the
conduct of monetary policy in the Euro area, the assumption of a targeting rule can be viewed
as a good …rst approximation of the operating procedure of the ECB.
The policy rule is modeled as the outcome of an intertemporal optimization problem in
which decision makers minimize a given criterion under the constraints provided by the struc-
ture of the economy. The optimizing device allows us to reverse engineer the objectives of the
monetary authorities, which are unobservable, from the observed path of policy rates imply-
ing that evidence on the latter can be interpreted as informative for the former. Since our
identi…cation strategy relies on the estimation of a model-based speci…cation for the reaction
function, we challenge the assumption of symmetric policy preferences in the context of a pop-
ular framework for monetary policy analysis. This is a version of the New-Keynesian model of
the business cycle derived in Yun (1996), and Woodford (2003, Ch. 3 and 4), among others.
2.1 The structure of the economy
This subsection describes an augmented version of the New-Keynesian sticky prices forward-
looking model in which the Phillips curve is speci…ed as a potentially convex relation. While
not microfounded, such a generalization is designed to control for an alternative source of non-
linearity such that the estimation of a reduced-form policy rule can unambiguously identify
asymmetric preferences. We will return to this issue in the empirical section. The evolution of
the state variables is compactly represented by the following two-equation system correspond-
5ing to an aggregate supply and to an aggregate demand relation, respectively:





yt = Etyt+1 ¡ '(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + "d
t (2)
Equation (1) captures in a log-linear fashion the staggered feature of a Calvo-type world
(1983) in which each …rm adjusts its price with a constant probability in any given period,
and independently of the time elapsed from the last adjustment. The discrete nature of price
setting creates an incentive to adjust prices by more the higher is the future in‡ation expected
at time t. The in‡ation level is ¼t whereas the output gap is denoted by yt and captures
the movements in marginal costs associated with variations in excess demand. Equation (2)
is a log-linearized version of a standard Euler equation for consumption combined with the
relevant market clearing condition. It basically brings the notion of consumption smoothing
into an aggregate demand formulation by making output gap a positive function of its expected
future value and a negative function of the real interest rate, it¡Et¼t+1. Lastly, "s
t and "d
t are
respectively cost and demand disturbances that obey a zero mean-reverting process.
The parameter ¿ governs any potential nonlinearity in the structure of the economy as it
allows the slope of the aggregate supply curve to be steeper at a higher level of in‡ation and
output gap (see Schaling, 1999). This implies that movements in the aggregate demand asso-
ciated to a monetary policy change like an interest rate increase generate a stronger (weaker)
e¤ect on output and a weaker (stronger) e¤ect on in‡ation when output is low (high). As
argued by Peersman and Smets (2003), this can be rationalized by the presence of either a
capacity constraint or some menu costs. Downward wage rigidity and the existence of money
illusion at very low rates of in‡ation may also account for such a convexity. Nevertheless,
linearity is recovered for ¿ = 0.
As shown by Galì and Gertler (1999), and Galì, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001 and 2003),
the New-Keynesian forward-looking Phillips curve provides a good …rst approximation to the
dynamics of US and Euro area in‡ation. Empirical support for a pure forward-looking ag-
6gregate supply relation can also be found in Ireland (2001) for the US and in Benigno and
Lopez-Salido (2002) for Germany. Smets and Wouters (2002) estimate an hybrid version of
the aggregate supply for the Euro area with Bayesian methods and …nd a highly dominant
forward-looking component in spite of a large prior in favor of a backward looking speci…ca-
tion.
2.2 A general speci…cation of the policy objectives
An important aspect of monetary policy making in such a model is that policy actions are
taken before the realization of economic shocks and therefore before the state variables are
determined. Accordingly, the central bank objective is to choose a path for interest rates at
the beginning of period t conditional upon the information available at the end of the previous







where ± is the discount factor and L stands for the period loss function. Our framework
di¤ers from the conventional quadratic set up as we employ a more general speci…cation of
the monetary authorities’ objectives. Indeed, the quadratic form may approximate reasonably
well a number of di¤erent functions and in the absence of a rigorous theoretical foundation
any speci…c nonquadratic proposal is destined to be unsatisfactory against the wide range of
plausible alternatives. Hence, rather than attempting to uncover the correct functional form of
policy makers’ preferences, we evaluate the symmetric quadratic paradigm upon the empirical
merits of the monetary policy rule that this speci…cation implies. With this descriptive scope
in mind, we write Lt as follows:
Lt =
e®(¼¡¼¤) ¡ ®(¼t ¡ ¼¤) ¡ 1
®2 + ¸
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The coe¢cients ¸ and ¹ represent the central bank’s aversion to output ‡uctuations around
potential and to interest rate level ‡uctuations around the target i¤. The policy preference
towards in‡ation stabilization is normalized to one and therefore ¸ and ¹ are expressed in rela-
7tive terms. The in‡ation target is ¼¤ whereas the parameters ® and ° capture any asymmetry
in the objective function of the monetary authorities.
The linex speci…cation in (4), which has been originally proposed by Varian (1974) and
Zellner (1986) in the context of Bayesian econometric analysis and introduced by Nobay and
Peel (1998) in the optimal monetary policy literature, embodies a number of appealing char-
acteristics. First, it allows for departures from the quadratic objective in that policy makers
may treat di¤erently positive and negative deviations of the target variables from the refer-
ence values. This pattern is shown in Figure 2 which plots the standard quadratic versus the
asymmetric function for both in‡ation (Panel a) and output gap (Panel b).
The key di¤erence between the two speci…cations is that deviations of the same size yield
di¤erent losses. Indeed, under the symmetric scenario policy makers are assumed to care
only about the magnitude of deviations whereas under asymmetric preferences they care also
about the sign. In particular, a positive value of ® in Panel (a) implies that, everything else
equal, deviations of in‡ation (relative to target) from above are weighted more severely than
deviations from below. To see this notice that whenever ¼t¡¼¤ > 0 the exponential component
of the loss function dominates the linear component while the opposite is true for ¼t ¡¼¤ < 0.
The same reasoning holds for the coe¢cient ° in Panel (b), which captures any asymmetry in
the policy preferences for stabilizing the business cycle. However, if monetary authorities are
more concerned about undershooting potential output rather than overshooting it, the value
of ° would be negative implying that whenever y < 0 the loss rises exponentially whereas it
does linearly for y > 0.
Furthermore, the linex loss function speci…ed above is so general as to collapse to the
symmetric quadratic form for a limiting case of the parameters. Applying twice L’Hôpital’s
rule on (4), it is possible to show that whenever ® and ° tend to zero the central bank objective









The latter can be obtained as a quadratic approximation of the utility-based welfare function
in a New-Keynesian model of the business cycle that involves a zero lower bound for nominal
8interest rate (see Woodford, 2003, Ch. 6).
2.3 A nonlinear policy rule
We let monetary authorities choose policy rates in a discretionary fashion. Indeed, the case
for an optimal monetary policy without commitment seems to be closer to the actual practice
of many Central Banks which rarely tie their hands over the course of future policy actions.
Because no endogenous state variable enters the model, the intertemporal policy problem
reduces to a sequence of static optimization problems. This amounts to choosing in each
period the instrument rate such as to minimize:
Et¡1
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yt = ¡'it + gt (7)
where Ft ´ Et¡1
P1
¿=1 ±¿Lt+¿, ft ´ µEt¼t+1 + "s
t and gt ´ Etyt+1 + 'Et¼t+1 + "d
t are taken
as given re‡ecting the fact that monetary authorities cannot directly manipulate expectations.













¸' + ¹(it ¡ i¤) = 0 (8)
and it implicitly describes a general reaction function according to which the central bank
moves policy rates as the optimal, potentially nonlinear, response to the developments in the
economy. The important result which underlies equation (8) is that it nests the conventional
linear form as a special case. Indeed, it can be shown by means of L’Hôpital’s rule that
whenever ®, ° and ¿ tend to zero, the reaction function (8) collapses to an implicit interest
rate rule of the type proposed by Taylor (1993):
¡k'Et¡1(¼t ¡ ¼¤) ¡ ¸'Et¡1 (yt) + ¹(it ¡ i¤) = 0 (9)
9This feature is attractive as it delivers a joint restriction on policy makers’ preferences and a
convex Phillips curve that can be formally tested for. It follows that the hypothesis of a linear
reaction function can be challenged by assessing whether the relevant coe¢cients are, either
jointly or marginally, signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The policy parameters ® and ° are
indeed crucial for the analysis of optimal monetary policy not only because they introduce an
asymmetric motive in the central bank objective function but also because, more importantly,
they make those asymmetries map into a nonlinear policy rule. This suggests that were ®
and ° identi…ed, the hypothesis that central bank preferences are symmetric around the target
could simply be tested by evaluating the functional form of the policy rule. Hence, evidence of
nonlinearity would be informative about which type of asymmetry, if any, is relevant to policy
makers.
3 From theory to data
The parameters ®, °, and ¿, and the exponential function govern the asymmetric response of
policy rates to positive and negative deviations of the state variables from the target. Our
task consists in estimating the nonlinear reaction function (8) in order to evaluate whether
those parameters are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This amounts to test linearity against
a nonlinear model, which is complicated by the fact that in small samples the estimation
criterion is insensitive to the so-called smoothness coe¢cients as there exists a large set of ®-
and °-values yielding almost the same interest rate behavior (see Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993,
Ch. 7). Moreover, the reduced-form estimates cannot recover all structural parameters, and in
particular ® and ° are not identi…ed. A simple transformation of the model that confronts the
issue directly involves the linearization of the exponential terms in (8) by means of a …rst-order
Taylor series expansion around ® = ° = ¿ = 0:

















¡ 2k2¿'Et¡1 ((¼t ¡ ¼¤)yt) + ¹(it ¡ i¤) + et = 0 (10)
with et being the remainder of the Taylor series approximation.
10This condition relates the policy rates with the expected values of the state variables con-
ditioned upon the information available at time t ¡ 1. Asymmetric preferences independently
introduce a squared component for in‡ation and output gaps respectively, whereas the non-
linear Phillips curve maps into the cross product of the state variables. We solve equation
(10) for it and prior to estimation we replace expected in‡ation and output gaps with actual
values. Moreover, as most of the empirical literature, we extend the model to include a partial
adjustment mechanism for setting monetary policy rate changes. This yields the following
interest rate reaction function:
it = (1 ¡ ½)
n
c0 + c1 (¼t ¡ ¼¤) + c2yt + c3(¼t ¡¼¤)
2 + c4 (yt)
2 + c5[(¼t ¡ ¼¤)yt]
o
+ ½it¡1 + vt
(11)
which is linear in the coe¢cients
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The term in curly brackets is a linear combination of forecast errors and therefore vt is orthog-
onal to any variable in the information set available at time t ¡ 1.
Equation (11) makes clear that by assuming an optimizing central bank behavior the reac-
tion function parameters can only be interpreted as convolutions of the coe¢cients representing
policy makers’ preferences and those describing the structure of the economy. Nevertheless,
the reduced-form parameters allow now to recover the asymmetric preferences since ® = 2c3=c1
and ° = 2c4=c2. Unfortunately, ¸ = c2k=c1 and ¿ = c5=(2c1k) cannot be identi…ed unless the
parameter k in the Phillips curve is estimated. While such an exercise would also provide a
direct evidence on convexity, it is beyond the focus of this paper on asymmetric preferences.
Accordingly, rather than using the cross product in (11) to recover ¿, we regard it as a control
variable for a potentially competing source of nonlinearity in the policy rule. Lastly, since no
11direct inference can be made on the relative weight on output stabilization, ¸, we discuss below
a simple way to identify it.
4 The evidence
This section reports the estimates of the ECB reaction function (11) and compares them to
estimates obtained for the US Federal Reserve over the same sample and for the German
Bundesbank over an earlier sample. The goal is twofold. First, the evidence for the US over
such a short period can serve to gauge the plausibility of our small-sample estimates relative
to the …ndings of nonlinearity for the Fed that has been recently documented by Dolado,
Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2002) and Surico (2002). Second, the evidence on German
monetary policy can be used to establish di¤erences and similarities between the Bundesbank
and the ECB.
The empirical analysis is conducted on monthly, seasonally adjusted, aggregated Euro data
until October 2002. As the number of observations available since January 1999 appear to
be too small to prevent incorrect inference, we expand the sample back to July 1997 when
the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact and the ongoing convergence among most EU
economies made the behavior of national aggregates rather homogenous. We end up with 64
observations that span a period of approximately …ve years. With reference to Germany, we
consider the period 1992:2-1998:12 which is meant to capture a stable, euro-converging policy
regime starting with the formal constitution of the ECB within the Maastricht Treaty.1
The data for Germany and the Euro area have been collected from Eurostat with the
exception of the interest rate and the DM/dollar exchange rate which are obtained from the
Bank for International Settlements data base. In‡ation is measured as the annualized rate of
change in the (harmonized) consumer price index, the output gap is constructed as the HP
detrended component of the (log) industrial production index (excluding construction) over the
period 1984:11-2002:10 while the 3-month money market interest rate (linked to EURIBOR
1Actually, the Maastricht Treaty entered into force only on November 1, 1993. Nevertheless, the convergence
between Euro area economies appears to be dated earlier.
12from January 1999 onwards) represents the short-term policy variable.2 Long-term interest
rates are 10-years government bond yields. The US series have been obtained from the web
site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The measures of in‡ation and output gap are
constructed using the same procedures described for their Euro area counterparts whereas the
policy variable is now the federal funds rate.
Before proceeding, a word of caution is needed to avoid a misleading interpretation of
our point estimates. The short time length and the potential lack of su¢cient variation in
in‡ation and output may lead to incorrect inference about the slope coe¢cients in the policy
reaction function. Inspection of Figure 1 reveals indeed that the sample period has not been
characterized by unusual volatility. However, it appears to contain su¢cient variation in output
gap with a standard deviation of 1:34, whereas the standard deviation of in‡ation is 0:68.
While this suggests that the estimates on the in‡ation response are better interpreted as a
lower bound, it also implies that the results must be taken with a grain of salt as they can
only represent the ECB conduct of monetary policy in a period of relative in‡ation stability.
4.1 ECB reaction functions
We estimate equation (11) for the Euro area using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
with an optimal weighting matrix that accounts for possible heteroskedasticity and serial cor-
relation in the error terms (see Hansen, 1982). In practice, we employ a twelve lag Newey-West
estimate of the covariance matrix. Four lags of the long-short interest rate spread, in‡ation and
output gap are included as instruments corresponding to a set of 6 overidentifying restrictions
that can be tested for.3 The choice of a relatively small number of lags for the instruments is
2The use of a low frequency …lter to obtain estimates of the target level of real activities does not contrast
with the model-based de…nition of ‡exible-price level of output. As argued by Woodford (2003), the central bank
can make society better o¤ by accommodating technology and preference shocks while o¤setting disturbances
to in‡ation and wage mark-ups. In this vein, Smets and Wouters (2003) show that if the monetary authorities
wish to hedge against shocks of unknown nature, they would regard persistent disturbances as the only shocks
a¤ecting the target level of output. When applied to the estimated New-Keynesian model for the Euro area
in Smets and Wouters (2002), they …nd that the counterfactual ‡exible-price level of output, which is the one
responding to all non-monetary shocks in the economy, is indeed extremely volatile, whereas the target level of
output, which is the one only a¤ected by supply and demand disturbances, follows a relatively smooth path.
3The choice of long-short spread, as opposed to short-term rate only, comes from the signi…cantly better …t
and more precise estimates of the model that the former implies. In selecting the instruments, we also take
into account the publication lags that are typically associated with the major statistical agencies, so that agents
13meant to minimize the potential small sample bias that may arise when too many overidentify-
ing restrictions are imposed. As a quantitative de…nition of price stability, we assume ¼¤ = 2%
prior to estimation. While broadly in line with the second pillar of the ECB monetary policy
strategy (see Issing, 2002b), such a choice does not a¤ect qualitatively any of the results as
opposed to the lower alternative 1:5% that has been recently discussed in Issing (2002a), and
advocated by Galì (2003), and Gerlach and Svensson (2002).4
Table 1 reports the estimates of the ECB feedback coe¢cients for several nonlinear spec-
i…cations ranging from the baseline (11) to some forward-looking variants. The …rst column
corresponds to the linear case (i.e. imposing c3 = c4 = c5 = 0) and it serves as a benchmark to
evaluate the impact of any potential nonlinearity. The last column displays a backward-looking
version estimated with OLS and it allows an evaluation of any potential small sample bias of
GMM estimates.
The coe¢cients on squared in‡ation, c3, are not signi…cant across all speci…cations whereas
those on squared output, c4, are always signi…cant and have the expected negative sign. The
parameter capturing nonlinearity from the structure of the economy, c5, shows relevance mainly
in the baseline case, consistently with the evidence in Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira
(2003), and Peersman and Smets (2002). While the coe¢cient on the in‡ation level, c1, is
in most cases statistically lower than one, the cross product of the state variables makes the
overall policy response to in‡ation in line with the so-called Taylor principle, but only for
su¢ciently large output expansions. Consider for instance the baseline case where beside a
value of 0:579 for ¼t, there is a signi…cant point estimate of 0:323 for the cross product term
(¼tyy). Then, values of the output gap larger than 1:3%, which according to Figure 1 have
occurred in the recent history of the Euro area, imply an in‡ation slope greater than one.5
forming expectations at time t¡1 only have information from period t¡2. The F-test applied to the …rst-stage
regression rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments.
4In particular, the point estimates and the standard errors attached to the nonlinear terms, which make the
main argument of the paper, appear to be not signi…cantly di¤erent from the baseline case. On the other hand,
the constant and the response to the in‡ation level take values stastically lower when ¼
¤ = 1:5%.
5There exists also an indirect channel through which the Taylor principle may hold for a forward looking
policy rule. A real interest rate decrease, as implied by a weak nominal response to anticipated in‡ation, opens
up a demand-driven positive wedge between actual and potential output. According to the state-dependent
reaction function, this is likely to imply a stabilizing response stemming from the multiplicative term of the
14The interest rate smoothing coe¢cient displays a fairly robust 0:7 whereas the constant,
which corresponds to the policy rate target, takes on average a value of 4:1 somewhat larger
than in the linear case. Not surprisingly, neglecting the nonlinear output gap component,
which enters the speci…cations with a negative sign, makes the linear estimates à la Clarida,
Galì and Gertler (1998) signi…cantly downward biased. Lastly, the backward estimates replicate
reasonably well the GMM results but the one on the in‡ation level. While this con…rms how
di¢cult can it be to identify the in‡ation slope with such a little variation, it also suggests
that the corresponding weak response, c1, is likely to be sample speci…c and therefore it may
well be overturned as soon as more observations become available.
A number of interesting results emerge from Table 1. First, ECB monetary policy can
be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule. Second, no asymmetry can be detected with re-
spect to the objective of price stability. In particular, the baseline estimates translate into an
asymmetric in‡ation parameter that is not statistically di¤erent from zero (see the …rst row of
Table 2). Nevertheless, the policy response to in‡ation appears to be stronger in booms than
in recessions through a convex structure of the economy. Third, there exists a signi…cant asym-
metry with respect to the business cycle in that output contractions require a more vigorous
response than output expansions of the same magnitude. To see this, notice that whenever
output is below potential both the level and the square call for a policy easing, whereas they
recommend opposite interventions otherwise. In particular, the baseline parameter on squared
values maps into a value of ° that is negative and statistically di¤erent from zero. Fourth,
the overall responses to in‡ation and to output gaps are state-dependent, though they are
associated with opposite phases of the business cycle.
4.2 Inheriting the mantle of the Bundesbank
We extend the empirical analysis to see how the Fed and the Bundesbank conduct monetary
policy, using the baseline speci…cation in (11). For Germany, four lags of the US federal funds
rate and the real DM/dollar rate are added as instruments. For both Central Banks, the
policy rule.
15in‡ation target is imposed at 2%. This is consistent with the ”unavoidable price increase”
announced by the Bundesbank (see Bo…nger, 2000) and with the Fed target rates reported by
the US Council of Economic Advisors (see Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira, 2003).
The …rst column of Table 3 shows that nonlinearity has played an important role also in
the Fed reaction function. In particular, the signi…cance of squared output gap and the mul-
tiplicative term translate into asymmetric preference parameters which are both statistically
di¤erent from zero (see the second row of Table 2). These …ndings mirror those reported by
Surico (2002) using quarterly data over some post-Volcker samples. Moreover, they also line
up with the argument made by Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2002) according to
which by allowing for a nonlinear response to in‡ation it is not possible to reject the hypothesis
that the parameter on the level is lower than one. Altogether, our small sample estimates seem
to perform reasonably well relative to earlier contributions.
Turning the attention to the Bundesbank, the second column reveals little evidence of non-
linearities over the period 1992:2-1998:12, broadly in line with the results on quarterly data
by Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002). However, this does not prevent the asymmetric output
gap parameter in the last row of Table 2 from being relevant at the 10% signi…cance level. A
comparison with the estimates by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1998) at monthly frequency over
an earlier sample con…rms that interest rates have a tendency to adjust slowly whereas the
in‡ation slope and the output gap slope we obtain are respectively lower and higher. Inter-
estingly, Clarida and Gertler (1997) show that while a linear speci…cation of the Bundesbank
reaction function implies an in‡ation slope lower than one, a nonlinear, asymmetric speci…-
cation makes the overall response in line with the Taylor principle. Moreover, they …nd the
response to output gap to be 0:56. This is consistent with the estimates reported in the second
column of Table 3, thereby suggesting that nonlinearity may account, at least partially, for the
‡atter (steeper) response to in‡ation (output) we obtain.
The results reported so far allow us to assess di¤erences and similarities between the three
Central Banks. To this end, we perform a Clarida, Galì and Gertler-type of experiment.
16Suppose that the ECB had followed a policy rule like the one estimated for the Bundesbank
and the Fed respectively. Then, it would be possible to construct the counterfactual interest
rate series that each alternative rule implies. This amounts to calculating at each point in
time the target rate under the three Central Banks’ reaction functions, given the historical
measure of in‡ation and output gaps for the Euro area. To the extent that the Fed and
the Bundesbank policy management can be referred to as successful examples, this exercise
represents a yardstick for evaluating the performance of the ECB monetary policy strategy.
Before proceeding, however, we should emphasize that the speci…cation of the central bank
reaction function is state-dependent and therefore our results are better interpreted as sample-
speci…c. This limits somehow the interpretation of the counterfactual experiment for the
Bundesbank, whose estimates refer to an earlier period, although we believe that a meaningful
comparison can still be drawn relative to the very beginning of the ECB mandate.
Figure 3 plots the target series corresponding to the ECB, the Bundesbank and the Fed
behavior respectively (the vertical line corresponds to January 1999). The top panel shows
that the target rate estimated under the ECB policy rule e¤ectively describes the behavior of
the actual interest rate, thereby providing a satisfactory test of the model.6 Moving to the
counterfactual targets is interesting to notice that both series capture the major swings in the
observed policy rate. Moreover, the correlation between the counterfactual Bundesbank target
rate and the target rate estimated for the ECB is 0:97, while the one between the latter and the
counterfactual Fed target rate is 0:94. However, the US implied path displays substantial di¤er-
ences in magnitude (see the right-hand side scale of the bottom panel), thereby corroborating
the view that the Fed response to the 2001 recession has been faster and larger.7 The results
of our experiment, which rely on a model based speci…cation of the policy rule, contrast with
6The performance would be even better using …tted rates, which also include lagged interest rates.
7Interestingly, in the annual report on Monitoring the European Central Bank edited by Begg et al. (2002)
in May, it is argued that ECB policy interventions are somewhat similar to the decisions that a Fed-in-Frankfurt
would have taken, and that the size of the gap between the actual and the simulated rate simply re‡ects the
di¤erent macroeconomic conditions of the US and the Euro area economies. However, in the December update,
the authors seem to re…ne the argument by leaning towards a more-passive monetary policy stance of the ECB
relative to the Fed.
17those by Faust, Rogers and Wright (2001), who using an ad hoc reaction function estimated
for the Bundesbank …nd that the Euro area interest rates are lower than the counterfactual
values. The linear speci…cation and the longer horizon ahead that they consider seem natural
candidates to explain the di¤erences.
We complete the comparative analysis by identifying the relative weight on output stabi-
lization for each Central Bank. To this end, Figure 4 shows ¸ as a function of k using the
baseline estimates for the formula ¸ = c2k=c1. The parameter k represents the linear compo-
nent of the Phillips curve slope, that is the slope that would emerge if ¿ were zero. In the case
of a convex aggregate supply curve (i.e. ¿ > 0) however, the slope is state-dependent and it is
determined by the interactions between k and ¿. Conditioned upon a similar structure of the
economy, the Fed concern toward output stabilization is twice as large as that estimated for
the ECB and the Bundesbank, neither being statistically di¤erent from the other. Moreover,
when assigned a speci…c value for k borrowed from the empirical literature (see Galì, Gertler
and Lopez-Salido, 2001, for the US and the Euro area, and Benigno and Lopez-Salido, 2002,
for Germany), the gap somewhat widens and the preference parameters on output prove to be
statistically di¤erent from zero.8 In the light of the large policy responses to the output gap
level reported in Table 1 and 3, the relative weight estimates suggest that the three Central
Banks all regard output gap mostly as a leading indicator for future in‡ation, and only to a
limited extent as a target per sè.
4.3 Adding a monetary aggregate
The prominent role for money advocated by the …rst pillar of the ECB strategy calls for an
important robustness check of our results to the inclusion of a monetary aggregate. To this end,
we enrich the structure of the economy with a money demand relationship, which postulates
the quantity of money that must be supplied by the central bank to support a given level
of the interest rate. This is a version of the speci…cation derived from microfoundations by
8If the structure of the economy were indeed nonlinear (i.e. ¿ > 0), the estimates of the linear component of
the slope, k, would be likely biased as they are derived by implicitly imposing ¿ = 0. While this suggests some
caution about interpreting the point estimates, it does not a¤ect the functional relations displayed in Figure 4.
18McCallum and Nelson (1999), and reads the demand for money holdings as a positive function
of the output gap and as a negative function of its opportunity cost. To make the model
consistent with a money growth rate formulation, we follow Söderström (2001) and we specify
the money demand equation in …rst di¤erences:
¢mt = ¼t + ¯¢yt ¡ µ¢it + "m
t (12)
The velocity disturbance "m
t follows a zero mean-reverting process.
We also augment the one-period loss function accordingly:
L0
t =
e®(¼¡¼¤) ¡ ®(¼t ¡ ¼¤) ¡ 1
®2 + ¸
"










e!(¢mt¡¢m¤) ¡ !(¢mt ¡ ¢m¤) ¡ 1
!2
#
and we let monetary authority to minimize (13) subject to (1), (2) and the additional constraint
(12). This leads to a linearized version of the optimal policy rule that is all alike the one in
(11) but three new components, namely (¢mt ¡ ¢m¤), (¢mt ¡ ¢m¤)
2 and (¢mt ¡¢m¤)yt,
whose coe¢cients are given respectively by
c6 =
¸¢m ['(k + ¯) + µ]
¹
, c7 =





The analytical approach to the solution of the optimal control problem allows to identify both
the relative weight on money growth stabilization, ¸¢m = c8=c5 and the asymmetric preference
parameter, ! = 2c7=c6.
The right bottom panel of Figure 1 displays the (log) M3 annual growth rate. The series
appears not only to contain su¢cient variation to identify its slope in the policy rule (the
standard deviation is 1:16), but it also shows a persistent pattern above the reference value
of 4:5%, with the period 2000:7-2001:3 being the most notable exception. We estimate the
money augmented policy rule with GMM expanding the instruments used in the baseline case
to include …ve lags of the M3 growth rate. Prior to estimation, we subtract the reference value
from ¢mt. The results are reported in Table 4.
19The linear estimates present an unexpected negative coe¢cient on money growth, which
is however overturned in the nonlinear speci…cation. In particular, while the level does have
explanatory power only at 10% signi…cant level, the square of the M3 growth rate, which
features an asymmetric behavior, takes a negative and highly signi…cant value. However, the
corresponding preference parameter, ¸¢m, is not statistically di¤erent from zero. Interestingly,
the latter does not imply that monetary aggregates are unimportant in ECB policy actions.
On the contrary, the M3 money growth rate appears to be monitored as a leading indicator for
future values of the state variables rather than as a target per sè in that it enters the reaction
function but not the policy objectives.9 Moreover, taking into account the few number of
observations below 4:5%, the positive value of c6 combined with the negative value of c7 implies
an asymmetric response that requires little adjustment, if any, above the reference value but
calls for more vigorous interventions below it. Lastly, the reduced-form and the preference
parameters on in‡ation and output gaps as well as the asymmetric characteristics of the policy
rule appear to be robust to the inclusion of a monetary aggregate. This is consistent with the
estimates in Gerdesmeier and Ro¢a (2003), who show using harmonized Euro area data over
the sample 1985:01-2002:2 that even though the money growth gap may signi…cantly enter the
interest rate reaction function, the point estimates for in‡ation and the output gap would be
una¤ected.
5 Conclusions
In‡ation targeting has become by now the common language spoken by policy makers, re-
searchers and economic advisors. As pointed out by a vast literature on the topic, such an
operational framework is better understood in the form of the announcement of an explicit
loss function with numerical relative weights on output gap stabilization (see Svensson, 2003).
To the extent that the ECB monetary policy strategy can be described as in‡ation targeting,
this paper o¤ers a preliminary evaluation of the …rst years of the Eurosystem through the es-
9See Gerlach and Svensson (2002), Issing et al. (2001), Nicoletti-Altimari (2001), and Trecroci and Vega
(2002) for a detailed empirical evidence on the information content of M3 money growth rate.
20timates of the policy preferences of the European Central Bank. In so doing, it generalizes the
conventional quadratic form of the loss function by allowing policy makers to weight di¤erently
positive and negative deviations of in‡ation and output from the target values.
The empirical analysis using aggregated Euro area data over the sample 1997:7-2002:10
shows that the ECB monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear, state-dependent
policy rule featuring a number of results. First, while equal concern appears to be given to the
risks of in‡ation as well as de‡ation, the policy preference on output stabilization is found to
be asymmetric in that negative deviations of a given amount imply larger policy easing than
the tightening required by positive deviations of the same size. Second, consistently with the
primary objective of price stability, the ECB weight on output stabilization is from one tenth to
one fourth as large as the weight on in‡ation stabilization. Moreover, such a relative preference
is not statistically di¤erent from the one estimated for the Bundesbank over an earlier sample,
whereas it is halved with respect to the preference estimated for the Fed over the same period.
Third, when compared to the counterfactual interest rates constructed using historical Euro
area data and the reaction function estimates for Germany and the US, the observed path of
the interest rate highly commoves with those that the Bundesbank and the Fed would have
followed if placed in Frankfurt. However, the actual Euro policy rate is much less volatile than
the one implied by a Fed-type of behavior. Fourth, the speci…cation of a monetary aggregate
relation in both the policy makers’ objectives and the structure of the economy reveals that
M3 growth rate is only a leading indicator for future in‡ation rather than also a target variable
per sè, consistently with the communication policy adopted by the ECB (see Issing, 2002b).
While the unavoidable short time length suggests some caution about interpreting these
results, we discuss the extent to which our estimates shed lights on Euro area monetary policy.
Further empirical investigation however is clearly needed and as soon as more data become
available our identi…cation method for (asymmetric) policy preferences might prove to be a
simple framework to evaluate the performance of the ECB.
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Table 1: Reduced-Form Estimates of the ECB Reaction Function 
- sample: 1997:07 2002:10 - 
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0123451 (1)(()) ttttttttt icccyccycyiv rpppr - =-+++++++  
Standard errors using a twelve lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in 
brackets. The dependent variable is the 3-month money market interest rate, inflation is 
measured as annualized changes in the harmonized index of consumer-price and output 
gap is obtained from detrending the log of the industrial production index with an HP 
filter (smoothing parameter=14400). Four lags of hicp inflation, output gap, and long-
short interest rate spread are included as instruments. k represents the number of months 
ahead for inflation. J(m) refers to the statistics of Hansen’s test for m overidentifying 
restrictions which is distributed as a  c
2(m) under the null hypothesis of valid 
overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance 
levels, respectively.   27








Output gap (g) 
 
European Central Bank 





     -0.899** 
(0.180) 
 
US Federal Reserve 
1997:07 – 2002:10 
 
    1.119* 
(0.572) 
 









  -0.572* 
(0.329) 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  The calculations of the point estimates as well as the 
standard errors of the ECB asymmetric preferences are based on the estimates of the 
baseline specification. The superscript ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, 
respectively.   28
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0123451 (1)(()) ttttttttt icccyccycyiv rpppr - =-+++++++  
Standard errors using a twelve lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in 
brackets. For the US, the dependent variable is federal funds rate, inflation is measured as 
annualized changes in the GDP chain-type price index and output gap is obtained from 
the Congressional Budget Office converting quarterly data to monthly data with a cubic-
match last interpolation. Four lags of gdp inflation, cbo output gap, and long-short 
interest rate spread are included as instruments. For Germany, the dependent variable is 
the 3-month money market interest rate, inflation is measured as annualized changes in 
the consumer price index and output gap is obtained detrending the log of the industrial 
production index with an HP filter (smoothing parameter=14400). Four lags of cpi 
inflation, output gap, long-short interest rate spread, the real DM/$ exchange rate and the 
federal funds rate are included as instruments. J(m) refers to the statistics of Hansen’s test 
for  m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a  c
2(m) under the null 
hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and 10 
percent significance levels, respectively.   29
Table 4: Reduced-Form Estimates of the ECB Reaction Function 
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0123456781 (1)(()()) ttttttttttttt icccyccycycmcmcmyiv rpppr - =-++++++D+D+D++
Standard errors using a twelve lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the 3 -month money market interest rate, inflation is measured as 
annualized changes in the harmonized index of consumer-price and output gap is obtained from 
detrending the log of the i ndustrial production index with an HP filter (smoothing 
parameter=14400). Four lags of hicp inflation, output gap, long-short interest rate spread and 
five lags of M3 money  annual  growth rate are included as instruments. J(m) refers to the 
statistics of Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a c
2(m) 
under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote 
the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and 10 
percent significance levels, respectively.   30
Figure 1 – Some Macro Aggregates for the Euro Area 
Sample 1997:7-2002:10. Inflation is measured as annualized changes in the harmonized 
index of consumer-price. Output gap is obtained from detrending the log of the industrial 
production index with an HP filter over the period 1984:11-2002:10. Short-term interest 
rate is the 3-month money market interest rate (linked to Euribor from 1999:1 onwards). 
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Figure 2 – Quadratic vs. Asymmetric Preferences 
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The point estimates conditional to the value of the linear component of the Phillips curve slope are: 
 
  Ecb  Buba  Fed 
Relative weight l  0.103  0.137  0.358 
(s.e.)  (0.022)  (0.078)  (0.115) 
 







(source)  Gali` et al (2001)  Benigno et al. (2002)  Gali` et al (2001) 
 